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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to estimate social benefits and social costs 
associated with a Feldsteinian-type gradual privatization of the Turkish 
Social Insurance Institute for Self –Employed Persons, “BK”. Based on 
data provided by the International Labor Organization, financial 
projections of the institution were made and extended to apply benefit-
cost model of privatization. Present value of the change in net social 
benefit was estimated. The effect of privatization on representative 
individuals has also been quantified. Results indicate that social benefits 
associated with a privatization alternative exceed the social costs even 
after adjustments for changes in key parameters that reduce social net 
benefits. However, privatization affects current representative individuals 
so negatively that it may constitute a “good political reason” to be against, 
rather than in favor of, choosing privatization. 
1. Introduction 
The Turkish social security system has been facing an extended 
financial crisis since the early 1990s. A low minimum retirement age, 
                                                 
1
 This paper is derived partly from my doctoral dissertation entitled “Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Turkish Social Security Reform Proposals” which covered each of the three 
state-run social security institutions in Turkey. This paper focuses on the Social 
Insurance Institution for Self-Employed Persons (BK) alone. For the SSK component, 
see Gümüş, E.  (2005).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1512653
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generous benefits relative to contributions, frequent political 
interventions, low contribution collection rates, existence of a large 
share of unregistered workers, underreporting of earnings, and other 
factors had made the system financially unsustainable.  
To overcome this problem and achieve long-run financial 
sustainability the Turkish government adopted new measures in 1999 
based mostly on a special report done by the International Labor 
Office2 (ILO, 1996a). With this new Law, the Turkish social security 
system has been restructured, but the pay-as-you-go financing method 
has been retained. Given that ILO outlined a privatization option for 
the Turkish social security system in its report and Turkey chose the 
restructured pay-as-you-go option, one can question whether this was 
a rational choice from social point of view. Would Turkey be better 
off with the privatization alternative instead? This paper is designed to 
answer this question. To do so, we estimate and evaluate the social 
benefits and costs of switching from re-structured Social Insurance 
Institution for Self-Employed Persons, “BK,” to a counterfactual 
privatization reform alternative.  
Plan of the paper is as follows. The next section gives brief 
information on the Turkish social security system. Section 3 reviews 
the literature on reform efforts of social security systems, while 
section 4 lists assumptions of the study. Section 5 builds a simple 
actuarial model and makes financial projections under both re-
structured pay-as-you-go and privatization scenarios for BK. The 
benefit-cost model is developed in section 6, and results are discussed 
in section 7. Finally, the last section concludes the paper by discussing 
some of the policy implications of results obtained. 
2. Turkish social security system 
The Turkish social security system was made up mainly of three 
institutions each run by the state:3 “The Social Insurance Institution” 
(hereafter “SSK”)4, “The State Employees’ Pension Fund” (hereafter 
                                                 
2
  See ILO (1996a). 
3  There are other organizations that provide social security to their members; however, 
they are not included in this study on account of their small size in terms of covered 
population and the lack of data. Among these are the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance 
Fund (OYAK), Special Institution for Personnel of Banks, Private Insurance 
Companies and Stock Exchanges, Eregli Miners’ Pension Fund, and Primary School 
Teachers’ Sickness and Provident Fund. 
4
  SSK was established to provide social protection for wage earners in 1945. It was 
reorganized in 1964 to increase its capacity. Persons covered by this institution are 
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ES)5, and “The Social Insurance Institution for Self-Employed 
Persons” (hereafter BK). They operate on a pay-as-you-go basis, and 
thus have the usual financial problems of such a system.6 However, 
just recently, as a part of continued reform efforts, a new law (Law 
number 5502) was approved by the Turkish parliament in May 2006. 
According to this new law, SSK, ES and BK will function under a 
single social security authority, called “Social Security Institution”. 
The purpose of unifying these three institutions is to harmonize the 
requirements for entitlement and health-retirement benefits for future 
members of all three institutions. The newly established agency will 
take a long time to function effectively and its merit may be evaluated 
in a separate study. In this paper, we focus on balances of BK as its 
mission will not be completed for many years to come. 
2.1. Types of insurance, contribution, and retirement benefits 
of BK 
Bağ-Kur was established in 1971 as the last social security 
institution in Turkey and became the second largest in terms of 
coverage. It covers self-employed workers and other professionals, 
including workers and farmers in agriculture. It provides both 
mandatory and voluntary insurance. The contribution rate is 20 
percent for old age, disability and death insurance.7 The insurable base 
is set by Laws numbered 2926 (for workers in the agricultural sectors) 
and 1479 (for self-employed persons). There is an income schedule in 
each of these Laws, with 24 pre-determined income levels which are 
used to calculate contribution.  A person, once insured, may choose an 
income level on which his or her insurance premium can be calculated 
and he or she cannot change this level of income later. However, the 
chosen level goes up automatically from year to year one level for the 
first 12 mandatory levels. The last 12 income levels are voluntary and 
go up once every two years. It is important to mention that the pre-
                                                                                                              
those employed by one or more employers on a contract basis. It covers approximately 
38 percent of the total population (Cavusoglu, 1998). 
5
  ES was established in 1949 as a part of the Ministry of Finance to provide social 
security to all civil servants employed by the central government, local governments, 
state economic enterprises and army members. It covers nearly 15 percent of the total 
population (Cavusoglu, 1998). 
6
  Although two components of the Turkish social security system (SSK and BK) were 
originally designed as fully-funded institutions, they operated as pay-as-you-go 
institutions in practice, due largely to insufficient income to fully cover the actuarial 
commitments (Undersecretariat of Treasury, 1999). 
7
  In this study, we concentrate on long-term insurance. For health insurance please see 
TUSIAD (2004). 
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determined amount of income in each level increases from the first 
level to the last in income schedule. Thus, contributions, and benefits 
upon retirement go up too. Concerning entitlement and calculation of 
benefits, there are different requirements for each type of benefits. To 
get entitled for disability benefit, for example, one must have loss of 
working ability and must have paid contribution for five complete 
years. Benefit would be 65 percent of average level of income on 
which the contributions were made. For full old age benefit, age 
requirement has to be fulfilled (58 for women and 60 for men) and the 
insured must have full contribution payment record of 25 years. If 
fulfilled, benefit would be calculated as (WA x RR) + SAP. Here WA 
represents weighted average of contributions paid at each income 
level considering time of payment, RR stands for replacement ratio, 
and SAP indicates social assistance payment. Requirement and 
calculation of death benefit is also similar to old age benefit.8 In this 
study, we use insurable base figures from ILO (1995b). 
2.2. Financial difficulties 
In evaluating the financial strength of an individual institution, 
or the system all together, one simply needs to look at the difference 
between total revenue it generates through payroll taxes or 
contributions that contributors pay to the system and total amount it 
spends (on benefits and other expenses), the difference between these 
two figures, and how this difference is likely to evolve over the years 
as the number of contributors and/or beneficiaries change. To do that, 
benefit formulas, magnitude of the contribution rates, conditions for 
retirement entitlements, the age structure of population covered, share 
of underground economy, underreporting of earning, the growth rates 
of wages and GDP, future interest rates and price levels need to be 
considered. A consideration of these indicated as of the mid-1990’s 
that the Turkish social security system was financially insolvent due 
mainly to a low retirement ages (Cavusoglu, 1998; TUSIAD, 1997; 
ILO, 1996a, 1996b; Sayan and Kiraci 2001a, 953), a low contribution 
collection rate (TUSIAD, 1996; ILO, 1996a), a low contribution base 
(TUSIAD, 1997), a low number of contributors9 (TUSIAD, 1997), a 
high number of retirees (Ercan and Gokce, 1998), and a high level of 
benefits relative to costs (Fisunoglu, 1998; Sayan and Teksoz, 2002), 
an increasing share of unregistered workers due to underground 
economic sectors, common underreporting of earnings. All these 
                                                 
8
  See TUSIAD (2004, 46, 53-55) for more detailed information. 
9
  It is about half of the current labor force. See TUSIAD (1997) for details. 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 173
factors revealed that the system could not survive unless appropriate 
measures were taken. 
Table 1 presents information about the number of contributors 
(active persons) and pensioners (passive persons) from 1985 to 2002 
for BK. It shows how the system’s membership composition has 
evolved over time, with the growth rate of the number of pensioners 
exceeding the growth of active members.  
Table 1 
Number of Active and Passive Persons by Year (000) 
Year Active Passive Year Active Passive 
1985 1927 294 1994 2617 826 
1986 2257 362 1995 2590 881 
1987 2451 411 1996 2564 947 
1988 2501 487 1997 2676 1032 
1989 2654 545 1998 2708 1105 
1990 2719 596 1999 2800 1180 
1991 2722 656 2000 3049 1277 
1992 2791 712 2001 3087 1344 
1993 2779 778 2002 3084 1394 
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization, Economic and Social Indicators, Part VIII, 
Developments in Social Sectors: Table 8-4.  (http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/esg/esg-i.html). 
Note: Active voluntary insured is not included in the table. 
 
The resulting decline in the active/passive ratios, continued to 
pull the current ratio below 3 as Figure 1 shows. Unlike the case in 
most developed countries, the reason for this decline was not the 
demographic change Turkey experienced. Rather, it was political 
choices that forced the system to pay benefits to individuals who paid 
little or no contribution (TUSIAD, 1997, 80). 
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Figure 1 
Active/Passive Ratios of BK. 
 
As social security deficit in Turkey continued to grow, 
increasingly more studies on reform alternatives before the Turkish 
social security system began to appear in the second half of the 1990s. 
While some such as the ILO report (1996a) argued that restructuring 
the existing pay-as-you-go system by adjusting the pension parameters 
in such ways to achieve higher contribution revenue and/or lower 
benefit payments would be enough to restore the long run financial 
equilibrium of the system, others have argued for replacing the current 
pay-as-you-go system with privately managed pension plans. Between 
these two polar cases, numerous alternatives were proposed. TUSIAD 
(1997), for example, suggested introduction of mandatory individual 
retirement accounts (IRA) to complement the publicly managed pay-
as-you-go schemes, or a so-called “two-tiered” system, whereas 
TUSIAD (2004) recommended a three-pillar system. Likewise, ILO 
developed four reform options for the Turkish social security system 
(1996a). Revenue-expenditure balances under each option have been 
quantified by using long-term actuarial projection models. Of these 
options, the first and second correspond to restructured pay-as-you-go 
and mandatory individual saving accounts options, respectively. The 
former represents continuity of the defined-benefit pay-as-you-go 
financing method and the latter represents a defined contribution 
method of privatization. The third and fourth options are designed as 
multi-tiered systems with basic insurance components. While the third 
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alternative supplements the basic insurance with a modest mandatory 
savings component, the fourth alternative gives workers and 
employers freedom to develop their own supplementary pension.10  
Despite a lively debate on the results of these studies and others 
surveyed in the next section, no study has so far estimated the benefits 
and costs of the proposed reform options. This study aims to do this 
for BK, one of the three components of Turkish social security 
system. The study specifically uses standard tools of benefit-cost 
analysis to evaluate BK under two financing methods, one (pay-as-
you-go) that has long been used in most countries and another 
(privatization) that has recently been adopted by many Latin 
American countries and received much attention worldwide. Little 
attention has been paid so far to the comparison of social costs and 
benefits. No study has evaluated benefits and costs of privatization for 
Turkey. This study aims to fill this gap for BK.  
3. The literature 
There are a significant number of studies that investigate the 
Turkish social security system, offering different reasons as to why 
the system has faced such a financial crisis, and suggesting ways to 
reform it. Many studies evaluated the social security reform act of 
1999 and offered additional parametric reform alternatives based on 
formal actuarial/computational analyses (see for example Sayan and 
Kiraci, 2001a and 2001b; TUSIAD, 1997; ILO, 1996a; Ercan and 
Gokce, 1998; Tuncay, 2005; Guzel, 2005; Alper, 2003). Yet, much 
emphasis in the literature in Turkey has been placed on the discussion 
of administrative structure of institutions. Whether administrative 
autonomy or privatization would solve the system’s long-run funding 
problem has been the subject of a long debate (Aydin 1998; Centel 
1997). Centel (1997) who discussed the issue in the context of EU 
accession, for example, argued that in order for the Turkish economy 
to integrate with the European economy, the Turkish social security 
system should be restructured in a way similar to European social 
security systems, concluding that the three Turkish social security 
institutions should be united under one organization with financial and 
administrative autonomy.  
Even though many scholars agreed on the need for financial and 
administrative autonomy for these institutions, pointing to the role of 
                                                 
10
 TUSIAD (1997) developed a two-tiered system similar to ILO’s (1996a) third reform 
option. 
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politically motivated interventions as the main cause of the crisis, 
there was no consensus on the need for unification. Granting 
autonomy would prevent deterioration in actuarial balances due to 
such political pressures (Akalin, 1999; Tuncay, 2000; Alper, 1999). 
Akalin (1999) noted that social security in Turkey is legally structured 
as a natural government monopoly that does not leave room for 
competition, causing economic inefficiency to prevail. The only way 
that the system may become efficient in providing its services and 
using its resources, the author argued, is to design the system within 
which the “invisible hand” could operate.  
Still, an opposition to unification was defended on different 
grounds. Alper (2003), for example, argued that the unification of the 
system is not an urgent policy. Unification requires more detailed 
records which are not currently available. Guzel (2005) and Tuncay 
(2005) insisted that there was no need to change the institutional 
structure of the system, suggesting that a solution within the current 
institutional setting was possible through employment policies that 
create more jobs. 11 While the debate on unification of the system 
continued, the legislation process for unification of the system was 
completed.   
As the number of studies on pay-as-you-go defined benefit 
social security systems has increased in the last two decades, much 
more attention has been given to identifying the weaknesses of the 
Turkish systems so that new policies can be developed accordingly. 
Sayan and Kiraci (2001a and 2001b) have in fact studied the Turkish 
social security system in this context. They have identified Turkish 
social security system parameters to minimize deficits generated by 
the system. They developed optimization models that find 
combinations of contribution and replacement rates as well as 
minimum retirement ages that will minimize pension deficits over 
their model horizons and concluded that if contribution and 
replacement rates were to be held at their current values, the minimum 
retirement age would have to be increased significantly.  
Since state managed pay–as-you-go systems have started having 
fiscal problems in other countries as well due mostly to demographic 
pressures to which, pay-as-you-go financing method is particularly 
vulnerable,  there has been a search for alternatives beyond parametric  
                                                 
11
 We agree with Alper (2003) in that organizational reform was not a priority step to 
take, since the lack of harmonization was not related with the core of the problem. 
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adjustments (Bovenberg and Sorensen, 2003).  A switch to a funded 
system through privatization has emerged as such an alternative and 
has already been adopted in different parts of the world. Privatization 
of social security started in Chile and has spread to other countries 
such as Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Columbia, and 
the United Kingdom (Kotlikoff, 1996).  
The choice between reforming or restructuring publicly 
managed defined-benefit pay-as-you-go schemes and moving to 
privately managed defined contribution plans has also been studied in 
comparative set ups. Imrohoroglu summarizes reform efforts of 
OECD member countries in this respect in a chapter in TUSIAD 
Report (2004, 77-101).  Further, Kotlikoff (1996) illustrated the 
effects of social security privatization by using the Auerbach-
Kotlikoff model and considering a rather simple privatization model 
for the United States. He concluded, based on simulation results under 
specific assumptions that privatizing social security would be likely to 
have a positive effect in the long-run on output and living standards, 
with a 4.5 percent of GDP welfare gain to future generations 
(Kotlikoff, 1996).  
While many scholars argue that the solution to social security 
problem may be privatization, everyone recognizes that the switch to 
private plans would be too costly. This is called the transition problem 
and involves the need to increase social security taxes (or impose a 
heavy burden) on current generations. Opponents of privatization 
argue that the transition path would be too costly to be politically 
acceptable even for the United States, given the current benefit and 
cost structure of the system (Feldstein and Samwick, 1998).  Feldstein 
and Samwick (1998) have examined the transition issues and 
described an alternative transition path for the United States’ social 
security system and concluded that privatization would generate very 
substantial long-run benefits which would be more than 5 percent of 
GDP every year and the transition costs would be relatively modest 
(Feldstein and Samwick, 1998). The transition issue has also been 
studied by TUSIAD (2004). It is argued in this report that the 
transition cost to a similar system12 would be reasonable given a high 
enough number of insured registering to this system (TUSIAD, 2004, 
173-174).   
Another potential problem with privatization of social security is 
unrealistic expectations of high rate of return. Opponents of 
                                                 
12
 See TUSIAD Report (2004) for more detail of the suggested new system. 
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privatization often state that the rate of return from privatization 
would not be much higher than what it is under the pay-as-you-go 
system, given the risky nature of the private securities. Baker (1998) 
criticizes privatization and argues that rates of return from 
privatization are often overstated, whereas the rates of return from the 
current pay-as-you-go system are underestimated.  
Also, it is widely believed that administration costs under 
privatization will be much higher than under the current system 
(Schulz, 2000; Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996). This argument has been a 
powerful tool in policy debates for opponents of privatization. 
Although the conceptual debate continues, Mitchell (1996) has done 
empirical work on this particular subject and found, by using private 
and public retirement system data for a number of countries, that 
administrative costs of publicly-managed social security systems 
differ significantly across countries and institutional settings.  She 
states that even though privately-managed social security systems are 
likely to have higher administrative costs than their public 
counterparts, she concludes, quality will be much better under private 
systems (Mitchell, 1996, 1-2). 
There are also studies that consider co-existence of public pay-
as-you-go and private schemes as in the so called multi-tiered or 
multi-pillar systems. Feldstein and Samwick (1999, 11) considered 
this combination for the US social security system and suggested a 
personal retirement account (PRA) program funded initially by a 2.3 
percent tax on earnings in addition to maintaining the existing social 
security trust fund at a level high enough to pay promised future 
benefits. In fact, many countries have been trying to find financially 
sustainable multi-tiered system. In a special report, for instance, 
TUSIAD (2004) has offered a new multi-tiered system for Turkey.13 
4. Assumptions14 
In this study, we have developed two alternative models for BK.  
The first alternative is the restructured Turkish BK based on a pay-as-
you-go underfunded method. The second alternative, the 
counterfactual, is a two-tier system, combining pay-as-you-go with a 
defined contribution method based on individual savings accounts. In 
this alternative, we assume a Feldsteinian-type privatization model 
that provides for a gradual privatization of the BK. Under the 
                                                 
13
  See TUSIAD report (2004) for further details of the proposed retirement system. 
14
  Please see Gümüş, E. (2001) for details. 
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privatization option, benefits will be paid and taxes will be collected 
out of two systems for the length of the period. Current workers as 
well as new workers will pay social security plus privatization taxes. 
While pay-as-you-go based taxes will be completely used to pay pay-
as-you-go benefits, privatization taxes will be used to pay benefits and 
administrative costs under the privatization alternative and any excess 
taxes will be invested.15 
To keep a common element between the two alternatives, 
benefits are held the same under both alternatives. In this way, the 
change in financing method and tax revenue will be the sole source of 
benefits and costs. Thus, we assume that the current restructured 
system16 benefits will not be different under privatization and that the 
tax base will be the same regardless of the system for the length of the 
period, which is from year 2000 to 2050.17  
In this study, ILO’s (1995b) data were used. Actual contribution 
rate is assumed to be at its statutory level for both reform options. We 
also use required, or effective, social security tax and privatization tax 
rates. We will explain each of them where appropriate. 
One vital assumption of the privatization option is the assumed 
real rate of return on investment. It is assumed that privatization tax 
revenue will be invested, and that a 9 percent real rate of return will be 
earned for each year in the length of the period.18 In sensitivity 
analysis, we alter this rate. 
 
 
                                                 
15
  All monetary figures stated in this study are in constant TL valued at 1995 price level. 
16
  In this study, current system or restructured system is based upon the 1999 reform as 
set out by the Law numbered 4447. 
17
 The length of the period seems short for examining multiple generations; however, 
secondary data were not available beyond 2050, and the generation of data beyond 
2050 raises difficult estimation problems. It is possible to generate data for another 50 
years or so but new projections on different variables may not be consistent with the 
ILO’ s secondary data. If longer period beyond year 2050 needs to be extended, the 
data should be generated by the same method for the whole period. We leave this 
extension as a subject of separate research. 
18
  TUSIAD (1997) used 9 percent real rate of return in its study, and we choose this rate 
as a maximum attainable rate in such a dynamic middle developing country where daily 
political agenda easily affects the directions of the main economic indicators. Thus, the 
real return can vary overtime, but on average 9 percent may be a good approximation. 
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5. Financial projections of BK under pay-as-you-go 
system  
5.1 Data and actuarial model 
Data used in this study are taken from ILO (1995b). However, 
ILO (1995b) reports annual data up to 2005 and every 5 to 10 years 
thereafter. Thus, we converted some of the data to yearly bases19. 
Additional parametric data were taken from the literature and their 
sources were mentioned in the text.  
In order to evaluate financial future of the institution, we 
develop a simple actuarial simulation model to make long-term 
financial projections. The actuarial simulation model is based on the 
following methodology which was first developed in Author (2001).  
Let Ζ represent the financial balance of the “Trust Fund” of a 
social security institution. Then the following equation can be written 
tttt OYTEGAZ +−=               (5.1) 
where GA stands for gross assets of an institution at the end of year t, 
consisting of the sum of previous year assets (PYA) and total social 
security contribution revenue (TR) at the end of year t. Hence, GA 
may be expressed as  
 ttt TRPYAGA +=                    (5.2) 
TE in equation 5.1 represents total expenditure of an institution 
at the end of year t. It includes benefits (B) paid to beneficiaries and 
administrative costs (AC) of an institution. This can be expressed in 
the following equation 
ttt CΑ+Β=ΤΕ              (5.3) 
Lastly, the term OY stands for other income of an institution 
such as interest earnings, and other non-contributory income. Here we 
assumed that an institution can earn interest income by investing net 
assets (NA) which may exist if revenue is greater than spending. If 
there exists such net assets (NA) in year t, they may be invested at rate 
g and generate income. Thus, OYt can be represented by the following 
equation 
gNAOY tt *=              (5.4) 
                                                 
19
  See Gümüş, E. (2001, 25-26) for details on data conversion method. 
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There are two more expressions implicit in equations (5.1) and 
(5.2) that can be represented in equation form. The first one is 
ttt tTBTR *=              (5.5) 
This equation is a simple revenue expression; however, it 
includes two very important variables for this study. TB stands for 
social security tax base or insurable base as the ILO (1995b) calls it. 
To estimate the social security tax base for the next fifty years or so 
requires a number of assumptions about primary economic and other 
related demographic and socio-economic variables. Fortunately, the 
ILO (1995b) has done that for Turkey and we rely on its data in this 
study. The second term in equation (5.5) represents the statutory social 
security tax rate in year t. We use both statutory and effective tax 
rates. While the former does not change from year to year, the latter is 
assumed to change every year so as to put the institution in financial 
balance.  
The second implicit equation mentioned above is the following: 
ttt TEGANA −=              (5.6) 
This equation gives the expression for net assets of an 
institution. NA is one of the sources of other income. If NA>0, then it 
will be invested and a positive investment income will be earned.20 
We assumed the rate of return from investing in government securities 
(required by law) to be 3 percent for the entire period.21  
Our objective in developing the simple actuarial model is to 
make Z (and hence NA) ≥ 0 each year for the entire period. Since the 
ILO reported that the deficit of the three Turkish social security 
institutions would continue in the entire period no matter which option 
is adopted, we assumed Z to be equal to zero. 
5.2. Financial projection of BK under PAYG alternative 
It is instructive to visualize the financial projection under each 
option so that we can understand BK’s financial structure and develop 
                                                 
20
 Feldstein and Samwick (1998) says that pay-as-you-go based social security earns, on 
average, a real rate of return equal to the growth rate of the economy. So we assumed 
this rate to be same growth rate of GDP in this study. 
21
 If NA=0, then, revenues and expenditures of the institution in question are equal, and 
no difference between statutory and effective tax rate exists. If, on the other hand, 
NA<0, then, there has to be income sufficient to pay the deficit. It may be obtained by 
borrowing. If it is, this is considered equivalent to an effective tax rate that will be 
increased sufficiently to eliminate deficit years in which NA<0.  
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alternative policies. Under the pay-as-you-go financing system, which 
is based on 1999 reform, BK will not generate sufficient revenue to 
pay its obligation each year as shown in Figure 2. 
The effective contribution rate is the rate at which the revenues 
of the institution are just equal to the outlays. In other words, the 
statutory rate is not sufficient to provide promised benefits and the 
rate has to be increased to generate required revenue. Hence, the 
effective contribution rate is the one at which current promised 
benefits can be provided.   
As can be seen in Figure 2, BK will eventually face a large 
deficit that is increasing at an increasing rate. Although it will have a 
surplus for ten years, it will have deficit that gets larger every year 
after 2010. This is not a surprise, given the facts of the institution.22 
Up to year 2026 the deficit is less than revenue of the institution. In 
year 2027 and thereafter, however, the deficit will be higher than the 
institution’s revenue. While the deficit in year 2026 is TL 129 Trillion 
(in 1995 TL values), income is TL 130 Trillion. In 2027 however, 
they are TL 136 and TL 135 Trillion, respectively. It gets even worse 
by 2050 with the deficit corresponding to 52.5 percent of the spending 
in that year.  
Figure 3 shows both rates. Starting in year 2005, the effective 
contribution rate increases constantly, reaching 43 percent, or 115 
percent higher than the statutory rate. At the end of the period it ends 
up at 44 percent.  
5.3. Privatization alternative 
There are two components under privatization alternative. One 
is a pay-as-you-go component that is maintained until the transition to 
privatization is completed.23  The  other  component  is  the  individual 
                                                 
22
 This institution was designed for self-employed individuals. There is no employer 
portion of the contribution. An insured person has to pay the entire statutory 
contribution rate, which is 20 percent of insurable base, if he or she wants to be 
covered. Further, collecting contributions from the insured is hard. This makes it 
difficult to have a financially sound institution. 
23
 Pay-as-you-go component: The methodology is similar to the one that we just 
developed in the previous section.  We assumed that the pay-as-you-go contribution 
rate would be paid by current workers as well as new entrants to the system. Benefits 
will be paid to those who are already retired and to those who are eligible under law 
numbered 4447. However, the number of eligible retirees will decline along with total 
benefit payments over time and the opposite will be true for ISAs. Thus, the same 
procedure developed above will be applied for the pay-as-you-go component of 
privatization. 
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 Figure 2 
Financial Outlook Under Current Law for BK 
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savings accounts that are invested in private securities.24 We assumed 
such a gradual privatization that the transition period would last for 
the entire projection period. 
The statutory BK contribution rate is assumed to be 20 percent 
of insurable base.25. Maintaining the promised benefit for the entire 
period requires a much higher effective contribution rate.  
5.4. Financial projections under privatization alternative  
Since most of the South American countries privatized their 
retirement systems, other countries have been closely watching the 
performance of these privatized retirement systems. The privatization  
 
                                                 
24
 Individual Savings Accounts Component: The same methodology is also employed 
here with some modifications. First, there are two administrative cost components that 
need to be separated. One is the cost of administering the disability and survivorship 
component. The other is the administration cost of individual savings accounts. Under 
the privatized part of the system, the disability and survivorship components require 
separate administration. Thus, the cost for this might be much less than the 
administrative costs of managing ISA funds. We followed the ILO (1995b) and 
assumed that one half of 1 percent (0.005) of the social security tax base will be 
sufficient for paying the administrative costs of the disability and survivorship 
components.  
25
  Data on insurable base for BK was taken from ILO (1995b). 
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Figure 3 
Tax Rates Under Current Law for BK 
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experience led the ILO to develop a reform option under Turkish 
parameters.  
The privatization alternative in this study is modified from the 
ILO’ s original work in two ways. First, in order to make comparisons 
among the alternative reform options, ILO kept the contribution rate, 
but in this study, we keep benefits the same under both alternatives. 
More explicitly, benefit expenditures for each institution from year 
2000 to 2050 will be same under both alternatives. Second, there will 
be no surplus in any fund or individual savings accounts (ISA) beyond 
year 2050.  
5.5. Financial projections under privatization alternative  
The privatization of BK seems very challenging. Figure 4 shows 
the tax rates under privatization for BK. STR shows the statutory 
contribution rate that is set at 20 percent. EFTR represents the 
effective contribution rate of the pay-as-you-go component.  
Although this rate is smaller than the statutory rate for the first 6 
years, it would increase as the transition to privatization progresses 
and reaches 30 percent in year 2016. As the privatization trust fund 
grows, the effective contribution rate of the pay-as-you-go component 
declines below the statutory contribution rate by year 2022. It would 
eventually be zero by the year 2044.  
ISATR is the contribution rate that would be applied to 
individual savings accounts. It starts at 4 percent and increases 
constantly, reaching 21 percent  by the year 2025, stays at this rate  for  
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Figure 4 
Tax Rates Under Privatization for BK 
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a couple of years, then stays roughly equal to the statutory rate until 
the end of the period in 2050.  When we sum up both rates required 
under privatization, ISATR and EFTR, we see that the total effective 
privatization tax rate (EPTR) would be higher than statutory tax rate 
for almost the entire period. 
This pattern in which the total privatization tax rate would be 
higher than the statutory contribution rate deserves further 
explanation.  The following figure helps. As shown in that figure there 
are two tax rates that would exist under both alternatives. ECTR is the 
effective tax rate that would prevail under the current law pay-as-you-
go system. EPTR is the effective rate that would prevail under the 
privatization system.  
Thus, the effective privatization tax would be higher than 
effective pay-as-you-go tax for the first 22 years and lower for the rest 
of the period. Indeed, the comparison between these effective tax rates 
is the one that matters, for benefit-cost analysis, not the comparison 
between statutory rates and effective rates. Furthermore, the prevailing 
effective contribution rates seem too high to be politically acceptable. 
Our aim here, however, is to show that if the promised benefits can 
only be financed by contribution rates what the rate would have to be.  
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Figure 5 
Effective Tax Rates with (EPTR) and Without (ECTR) Privatization 
for BK 
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6. Benefit-cost analysis  
As Feldstein (1996a) explained in his paper, social security 
privatization has primarily three impacts on the economy. The first 
impact has to do with the effect of taxes that government collects on 
the labor supply. The second impact of privatization is on the nation’s 
capital stock. More specifically, privatization will allow some of the 
taxes used to finance social security to be invested in the stock market. 
The real rate of return on these investments is expected to be higher 
than the real rate of return on government securities. Thus, it will help 
to increase the nation’s capital stock. This is especially important for 
developing economies. 
 Because of privatization, there would be also a change in 
government saving. The change in government saving will have an 
impact on capital accumulation through its effect on crowding-out or 
crowding-in of private investment.  
The last impact would be the change in the costs of 
administering the system. It is widely believed that the administration 
cost of social security under privatization would be much higher than 
it is under the current pay-as-you-go financing method.  
These impacts are the sources of the social benefits and social 
costs of privatization. We think that changes in tax rates and in 
national saving would generate social benefits that exceed social costs, 
while changes in administration costs will generate social costs. The 
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net benefit will depend upon the difference between the values of 
these impacts. 
6.1. The model 
In order to estimate the changes in benefits and costs outlined in 
the previous section, we will use the traditional benefit-cost model 
that is widely used in evaluating public programs and projects. A 
benefit-cost analysis requires a comparison of two scenarios: one 
“without” the alternative being evaluated, and one “with” the 
alternative in place. The “without” scenario is a projection of the 
future with the current Turkish social security system, as recently 
reformed. The “with” scenario is a projection of the future with the 
privatization alternative instead of the current system. The ILO has 
developed the basic elements of both of these scenarios. We will use 
these scenarios in our analysis, supplemented by additional data, as 
necessary26. We will examine these scenarios carefully, however, for 
debatable assumptions and parameters and incorporate reasonable 
alternative assumptions and parameters in the sensitivity analysis.  
In its simplest form, net benefit (NB) can be expressed as 
CBNB −=                                     (6.1) 
Where B is benefit and C is cost. 
Since benefits and costs are often realized at different times they 
are not comparable unless they are expressed in terms of present 
values that can be obtained by using appropriate discounting 
(Gramlich, 1990). The present value of a benefit, Bt, in any future year 
t is Bt/(1+r) t, where r is the discount rate. Similarly, the present value 
of a cost, Ct, in any future year t is Ct/(1+r) t. The present value of the 
net benefit in a future year, t, can be expressed as 
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                                           (6.2) 
                                                 
26
 The cost-benefit analysis in this study requires the use of a number of additional 
parameter values and data in addition to that generated from our actuarial model and 
data provided by ILO (1995b). Some of these come from relevant literature, and we 
have calculated some of them ourselves. To calculate the marginal welfare cost of 
taxation, we need the aggregate marginal tax rate, m, the compensated labor supply 
elasticity, η, and total labor income, wL2. We use 30.5 percent for m, which is taken 
from OECD (1998, 156). The value of the labor supply elasticity is taken from Sayan 
and Kenc’s study ( 2001). As for the total labor income, there were no data projections 
available for the period this study covers. By using national average wage from ILO 
(1996b) we calculated total labor income. 
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The present value of a stream of net benefits can be expressed as 
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Given the benefits and costs described above, the model can be 
expressed in the following way symbolically; 
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In equation (6.4) sources of benefits and costs would be 
“increases or decreases in GDP due to changes in contribution, 
government savings, administrative costs and private savings. 
It is important to mention that all items except administrative 
costs are the source of costs for some years and of benefits for other 
years. Hence, we express them in “change in net present value” term. 
Given the need to pay promised benefits to current retirees while 
simultaneously building up privatized trust funds for future retirees, an 
initial increase in taxes, or reduction in other government 
expenditures, is required. We assume the former. Thus, welfare cost of 
taxation, WCt, will be positive initially. If the rate of return on private 
securities exceeds the rate of return on government securities, the 
required trust funds can be achieved eventually with lower taxes. 
Thus, WCt will eventually turn negative as the privatization alternative 
matures.  
Privatization will initially increase the government budget 
deficit, or reduce government saving resulting in reduced GDP. 
Eventually, however, the deficit will fall and GDP will increase as a 
result.  
The effect of privatization on administrative cost is expected to 
have an unambiguous effect on net benefits. That is, privatization 
should increase administrative costs throughout the entire study 
period. 
In evaluating public programs, choosing the right discount rate 
is very important. We will use the discount rate, r, that is known as the 
social discount rate.  
The basic question is whether the “present value of change in 
net benefit” (∆PVNB) in equation (6.4) is greater than zero. If it is, 
then privatizing the social security system will produce a potential 
Pareto improvement. 
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Given reasonable doubt about the value of certain parameters, 
sensitivity analysis will be performed.  
From the individual viewpoint, the change in wealth of 
representative individuals will also be estimated under both 
alternatives. This will be done by calculating the present value of 
benefits and costs with and without privatization. The change in 
wealth of each representative individual is the difference between the 
change in present value of benefits and costs. 
6.2. Sources of costs and benefits 
6.2.1. Marginal welfare cost of taxation 
Economic theory suggests that the social security payroll tax 
distorts the labor supply decision. Feldstein (1995, 1996a) states that 
the payroll tax distorts occupational choice, location, number of hours 
individuals work, and work effort. In this study we emphasize the 
effects of social security on number of hours worked and the 
subsequent welfare cost of taxation.  We will estimate the marginal 
welfare cost of taxation for each year through the year 2050 using 
Browning’s (1987) partial equilibrium model of marginal welfare 
costs. 
Browning’s model is illustrated in figure 6. Here S* is a 
compensated labor supply curve, the worker’s wage rate is w, the 
aggregate marginal tax rate is m and the net marginal wage rate is (1-
m)w which corresponds to the aggregate marginal tax rate without 
privatization. An increase in the tax rate would increase the aggregate 
marginal tax rate to m’ and the net wage rate would be (1-m’)w. 
Figure 6 
Change in marginal welfare cost of taxation 
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Source: Browning (1987, 17). 
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The privatization option will necessitate an initially larger 
subsidy to social security from general revenue than under the 
restructured system or an effective increase in taxes required to 
finance social security. After a transition period the general revenue 
subsidy will fall relative to the pay-as-you-go restructured system and 
there will be a decrease in the marginal tax rate. The increase 
(decrease) in the marginal tax rate creates a marginal welfare cost 
(benefit).  When the marginal tax rate increases from m to m’ (as in 
Figure 6), there will be a reduction in the quantity of labor supplied 
along the compensated supply curve to L3. Therefore, marginal 
welfare cost resulting from a change in the tax rate is equal to the area 
of ACDE in figure 6 and represented by WC. ACDE is equivalent to  
[ ] 2'
2
1 dLwmwmWC +=             (6.5) 
Because m’ is equal to m + dm and dL2 is equal to [ηL2/(1-
m)]dm, equation (6.5) can be expressed as 
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=            (6.6) 
In equation (6.6) the new parameter η  is the labor supply 
elasticity.   
The equation (6.6) briefly says that when contribution rate 
increases (decreases), through labor market distortions, it would create 
cost (benefit) to society by reducing (increasing) welfare. Thus, we 
will calculate this marginal welfare cost of tax contribution using 
equation (6.6). 
6.2.2. Private saving 
 Changes in taxes will also affect the value of the wealth 
represented by the retirement system and thus potentially affect GDP. 
Actually, there have been many studies that investigate the 
relationship between private saving and pay-as-you-go- based social 
security system both theoretically and empirically. These studies 
include Barro (1974) and Feldstein (1974). While Barro (1974) argues 
that there is no significant adverse effect of social security on private 
saving, Feldstein (1974) argues and found evidence otherwise. They 
continued their arguments empirically. These studies include Barro 
(1978) and Feldstein (1978; 1996b). More recently, Meguire (1998), 
Attanasio and Paiella (2001), and Alessie and Kapteyn (2001) looked 
these issues again. They found evidence that supports Feldstein’s 
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view. Coronado (1997) for instance, studied the effects of 
privatization on household saving from Chilean social security 
privatization experience. He also found evidence that supports 
Feldstein’s view.  
In this study we follow Feldstein (1996a) view as he indicates, 
social security wealth (SSW) will be changed as taxes change. Social 
security wealth is the net present actuarial value of expected future 
benefits and costs. An increase in taxes reduces SSW and a reduction 
in taxes increases SSW.  Feldstein (1974, 1996b) studied the 
relationship between social security and saving and concluded that 
social security wealth reduces private saving. Changes in private 
saving affect the capital stock and GDP. Specifically, an increase in 
private saving will have a positive effect on the capital stock and 
GDP.  
6.2.3. Government saving 
There is another potential impact of privatization on the capital 
stock and GDP. This impact comes from the changes in government 
saving as a result of privatization. Privatization will change the size of 
the government’s net budget balance-the surplus or deficit. If the 
budget deficit shrinks (grows), government borrowing will decrease 
(increase), “crowding in” (out) private investment. If privatization 
crowds in (out) private investment, the capital stock and potential 
GDP will increase (decrease). Under both the existing BK system and 
privatization scenario, there will be no social security surplus. There 
will be a change in the size of the social security deficit, however. We 
assume that this deficit will be financed by borrowing rather than by 
reductions in other government expenditures. Therefore, the costs and 
benefits from changes in the deficit will come from changes in private 
investment, rather than from changes in other government programs. 
6.2.4. Administrative costs 
The fourth source of benefits and costs of privatization is from 
the changes in the cost of administering the system. It is widely 
believed that the privatization of social security would increase 
administrative costs (Schulz, 2000; Mitchell, 1996; Mitchell and 
Zeldes, 1996), given the higher cost of managing portfolios of private 
securities than the cost of managing government securities. Thus, we 
will estimate the changes in the cost of administering the BK under 
the privatization alternative. 
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7. Benefit-cost results27 
There are four benefit-cost categories that have been identified 
and estimated. 
7.1. Marginal welfare cost of taxation 
The marginal welfare cost of taxation (MWC) in this study 
essentially tells us that a change in social security tax rates produces 
costs or benefits to society depending on the direction of the change. 
In other words, a change in social security tax rates will alter the well-
being of the society either negatively or positively. 
Change in contribution rate of BK may have important welfare 
implications for two primary reasons. First, insurees in this institution 
pay the whole contribution; there is no employer contribution. Second, 
the rate of compliance may decrease if the rate of contribution 
increases rapidly. Figure 7 shows the changes in marginal welfare cost 
of taxation (∆MWC) due to change in contribution rate for BK assuming 
no change in compliance. For the early transition years, the social cost of 
privatizing this institution increases. By the year 2023, however, the 
social cost disappears and social benefits begin (as taxes fall) and 
increase at an increasing rate. Overall, the change in the contribution rate 
produces social benefits much larger than social costs. 
7.2. Administrative costs 
The second benefit-cost category is the change in administrative 
costs between the two alternatives. Figure 8 shows the change in 
administration costs of BK. The area under the curve should be 
interpreted as social cost. 
Although it generates only social cost, it is relatively small if we 
compare this cost, for instance, with the marginal welfare cost of 
taxation. While the cumulative change in administration cost would be 
TL 789 Trillion, it only constitutes nearly 89 percent of the social 
benefit that would be generated in year 2026, alone, from the decline 
in the contribution rate. 
 
                                                 
27
 In this section, the results of the benefit-cost analysis described in the previous section 
will be presented. It should be noted that the results are to be evaluated based on the 
assumptions of the study. 
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Figure 7 
Change in Marginal Cost of Taxation from Privatizing BK 
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7.3. Government saving 
The third benefit-cost category for BK is the change in GDP due 
to changes in government saving as a result of the change in the way 
the BK is financed. The social security budget is generally kept 
separately in Turkey. However, it is considered part of the government 
budget (consolidated) and it is, therefore, used for political purposes. 
While social security surpluses can be used to finance various 
governmental programs, they can also be used to retire government 
debt; that is, they can be “saved”. Changes in “government saving” 
would lead to changes in investment that, in turn, change GDP. 
As we stated in the previous section, contribution compliance 
is a real issue for this institution. This stems from the fact that the 
participants in this institution are self-employed. Thus, contribution 
compliance along with higher contributions may make it harder to 
generate enough revenue to pay necessary benefits. As a result, the 
treasury may have to transfer extra general revenue to this 
institution to pay benefits. This problem diminishes as privatization 
progresses. Ignoring compliance problems, the change in GDP due 
to the change in government saving would be positive as depicted 
in figure 9.  
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Figure 8 
Changes in Administrative Costs from Privatizing BK 
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Figure 9 
Change in GDP Due to Change in Government Saving from 
Privatizing BK 
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7.4. Private saving 
Figure 10 illustrates the change in GDP due to the change in 
private saving from privatizing BK. The change in GDP due to change 
in private saving has two periods. The change in GDP during the first 
period is positive for about 23 years; it is negative, and much larger, 
for last 28 years. Net benefit for the entire period is negative.  
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Figure 10 
Change in GDP Due to Change in Private Saving from Privatizing BK 
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7.5. Net benefits and present values of net benefits from 
privatizing BK 
We presented the results for the four benefit-cost categories 
above. However, for benefit-cost analysis, it is the present values of 
the change in net benefit that matters. The changes in net benefit and 
present value of net benefit are illustrated in figure 11. During the first 
22-year period both the change in net benefit and present value of net 
benefit are negative, indicating that social cost is higher than social 
benefit. For the last 29 year-period, however, the reverse is true. For 
the whole period, the change in present value of net benefit for BK is 
TL 22,448 Trillion (in 1995 TL values).  Hence, privatization of BK 
would be a potential Pareto improvement. 
7.6. Summary of benefit-cost results  
We have summarized the changes in present values of social 
benefits (∆PVB), social costs (∆PVC), and social net benefits 
(∆PVNB) according to source, for BK in table 2. Changes in the 
marginal welfare cost of taxation (∆MWC) due to the changes in 
social security contribution rates are reported in the first column. It is 
apparent in the table that the changes in the social security tax rates 
yield both costs and benefits, in present value equivalents. The present 
values of social costs result from additional higher contribution rates 
due to privatization (first 23 years), and the present values of social 
benefits result from the lower contribution rates that prevail under 
privatization for the remaining years. The change in net social benefit 
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(∆PVNB=∆PVB-∆PVC) due to ∆MWC is positive. It is TL 24,023 
Trillion. In fact, the marginal welfare cost of taxation due to 
privatization yields positive present values of net social benefit that 
constitute 107 percent of the total present value of net benefit. 
Figure 11 
Changes in Net Benefits and in Present Values of Net Benefits for BK 
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Changes in administrative costs have an unambiguous impact as 
expected. However, they have small impacts on the present values of 
net social benefit. They contribute only 2.5 percent of the present 
value of the change in social cost. The changes in administrative costs 
(∆AC) are presented in the second column in table 2. 
The changes in GDP due to the changes in government saving 
are reported in the third column in table 2. The impact on the present 
value of net social benefits from the changes in GDP due to 
government saving is significantly larger than the impact of 
administrative costs. The net effect of the change in private saving on 
GDP was negative. As Feldstein (1996b) states, upon privatization, 
additional taxes (or higher social security taxes) are necessary in the 
transition period. This reduces public retirement wealth, leading 
people to consume less and save more of their income. Hence, an 
increase in taxes causes a higher level of private saving. After the 
transition, however, taxes decline, causing public retirement wealth to 
increase. As a result, private saving declines. By looking at the 
column for ∆GDPp in table 2, we see the same pattern. The overall 
effect, in present value terms, however, is negative.  
Of the four benefit-cost categories, ∆AC and ∆GDPp have 
negative net present values. In fact, the latter has greater negative 
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present values of net benefit than the former. The present value of net 
benefit due to the change in administrative cost (∆AC) is 
approximately 7 percent of the ∆PVNB due to the change in GDP 
(∆GDPp).  
In terms of benefits, the change in taxes (∆MWC) is the largest 
component. In particular, 86 percent of the change in present value of 
benefit comes from ∆MWC.  
In table 2, the last column gives the horizontal summation. 
∆PVNB is TL 22,448 Trillion. Thus, it has huge significantly positive 
∆PVNB. Therefore, based on this result, alone, privatizing the BK 
would produce a potential Pareto improvement for Turkey.28 
Table 2 
Summary of Benefit-Cost Results for BK (In Trillion TL) 
Type                                Benefit-Cost Sources 
 ∆MWC ∆AC ∆GDPg ∆GDPp Total 
∆PVB 30,393 0 3,256 1,737 35,385 
∆PVC -6,369 -317 0 -6,251 -12,937 
∆PVNB 24,023 -317 3,256 -4,514 22,448 
∆PVB represents present value of change in benefit, ∆PVC represents present value of change 
in cost, and ∆PVNB represents present value of change in net benefit. 
Note: Negative figures indicate costs. 
7.7. Sensitivity analysis 
The benefit-cost results are based on a number of assumptions 
that were stated in section 4. In this section, we make changes in key 
parameters that appear to be most likely to affect ∆PVNB, and provide 
estimates of the effects of these changes.  
7.7.1. Discount rate adjustment 
We have used a real discount rate of 3 percent as a proxy for a 
high-end estimate of the social rate of time preference. For sensitivity 
analysis, we apply rates of 2 and 4 percent. While we expect an 
increase in ∆PVNB when substituting 2 percent for 3 percent, the 
reverse is expected if 4 percent used instead of 3. Table 3 shows the 
results. It should be noted that even though the rate of decrease and 
increase in the real discount rate is the same (±0.01 or ±33.3 percent), 
the changes in the results are not same. Although the effect of 
                                                 
28
 We calculated the internal rate of return (IRR) based on the data underlying table 2. It is 
11.86 percent. This estimate is significantly greater than zero. Whether it is greater than 
the best alternative rate is unknown. 
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changing the real discount rate to 4 percent causes one of the largest 
declines in the ∆PVNB, the resultant ∆PVNB is still significantly 
greater than zero. This is not a surprising result. In fact, the IRR 
reported earlier indicates that PVdNB will remain positive for real 
rates up to the range of 11-12 percent. These are well out of the range 
of reasonable adjustment. 
7.7.2. Risk adjustment 
We have assumed and used a 9 percent real rate of return (ROR) 
on the balances in the privatization trust funds. Given the dynamic 
nature of the Turkish economy this rate may be justified. In fact, 
TUSIAD (1997) used this rate in its privatization study. However, this 
method does not account for variations in returns.  
We use two methods to account for such variation. One reduces 
the 9 percent ROR by risk premia. The other is a rise in the 
contribution rate.  
Two risk premia are used: 2 percent and 4 percent. The 2 
percent premium reduces the ROR to 7 percent, or about half of the 
14.06 percent ROR earned on Turkish equities from 1990-1999.29 The 
4 percent premium reduces the ROR to approximately the level 
considered by Feldstein and Samwick (1999) as a certainty equivalent 
for a U.S. 9 percent ROR. 
Table 3 summarizes sensitivity results that are obtained by the 
risk premium adjustments. Using a 7 percent real rate of return 
reduces ∆PVNB by 27 percent. While the substitution of 7 percent for 
the 9 percent used in the original calculations reduces the ∆PVNB as 
we expected, it still has large positive ∆PVNB. 
When the 5 percent real rate of return is substituted for 9 
percent, the resultant ∆PVNB is still positive. It is TL 9,164 Trillion. 
The reduction from the original ∆PVNB is 59 percent. 
7.7.3. Adjustment for labor supply elasticity 
We followed Browning’s (1987) partial equilibrium model of 
the welfare cost of taxation. In his study, Browning gives the range of 
labor supply elasticity to be between 0.2 and 0.4. We used a labor 
supply elasticity of 0.2, from Sayan and Kenc (2001), in original 
                                                 
29
 Real interest rate in the 1990s are as follows (%): 1990, 14.2, 1991, 9.1, 1992, 10.3, 
1993, 16.3, 1994, 16.7, 1995, 13.2, 1996, 17.3, 1997, 2.6, 1998, 15.7, and 1999, 25.2. 
These rates are taken from IMF Staff Country Report No: 00/14, February 2000, page 
14. See report for details. 
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calculation. We changed it ±0.1 to see how results would change, 
however. Using 0.3 for the labor supply elasticity, the ∆PVNB 
increased by TL 12,011 Trillion, as shown in table 3. By substituting 
0.1 for 0.2, almost exactly the same amount of change in ∆PVNB 
occurred in the opposite direction. The change in the elasticity of labor 
supply has significant effect, about a 53.5 percent change in PVdNB. 
This may be attributed to the high contribution rate necessitated with 
this institution. These rates make individuals under this institution 
highly sensitive to changes in supply elasticity.   
Table 3 
Sensitivity Results: Change From Reference Level  
(In Trillion TL, Percent) 
Measure  Value ∆PVNB ∆(∆PVNB) IRR ∆IRR 
Reference 9% 22,449  11.86  
Risk Adj. 7% 16,377 -6,072 8.84 -3.02 
Risk Adj. (2) 5% 9,164 -13,285 6.06 -5.80 
Disc. Adj. 2% 34,022 11,573 12.04 0.18 
Disc. Adj. 4% 14,737 -7,712 11.71 -0.15 
L. Sply. Elasticity 0.3 34,460 12,011 10.83 -1.03 
L. Sply. Elasticity 0.1 10,437 -12,012 239.12 227.26 
Admin. Costs 2% 18,743 -3,706 10.11 -1.75 
∆PVNB represents present value of change in net benefit, and ∆IRR represents change in 
IRR. 
7.7.4. Adjustment for administrative costs 
We assumed administrative costs equal to one percent of gross 
assets for the privatization trust fund in our original calculations. We 
increased this rate by 100 percent in the sensitivity analysis. As can be 
seen in the last row of table 3, it reduces the ∆PVNB by 16.5 percent. 
Overall, the ∆PVNB is highly dependent upon the real rate of return, 
the real discount rate, and administration costs.  
7.7.5. Tax rate increase 
In his article, Feldstein (1997) indicates that a 50 percent 
increase in the contribution rate (from 2 to 3 percent) to a U.S. 
privatization trust fund (coupled with the continuation of the present 
system during a phase-in period) would “virtually rule out the 
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possibility –less than one chance in 1,000 – of not being able to 
fund”30 benefits.  
Assuming that such an increase for Turkey would virtually 
eliminate risk as well, we increased the contribution rate for BK.  
The results are presented in table 4. The original values of 
∆PVNB are reported in the first row. The middle row shows the result 
of the ∆PVNB after introducing 50 percent ISA tax increase. The last 
row shows the change in the ∆PVNB between the original values and 
values after the increase in the ISA tax rate by 50 percent. Overall, the 
increase in the ISA tax rate causes ∆PVNB to fall from TL 22,448 
Trillion to TL 11,420 Trillion, a 49 percent reduction.  
Table 4 
Sensitivity Results: ISA Tax Rate Increase  
By 50 Percent (Trillion TL) 
Values ∆MWC ∆AC ∆GDPg ∆GDPp Total 
∆PVNB 
A 24,023 -317 3,256 -4,514 22,448 
B 1,670 -816 10,196 370 11,420 
C -22,353 -499 6,940 4,884 -11,028 
A: Original values, B: ISA tax increase by 50 percent, C: Differences between A and B. 
7.8. Privatization impact on representative individuals 
Up till now, we have analyzed benefits and costs from a social 
perspective. The positive net present values of social benefits that we 
obtained cover the period, 2000 to 2050. However, not everyone will 
gain from privatization. Results of a similar analysis for the U.S. by 
Feldstein and Samvick (1998) suggest that many current Turkish 
workers would experience reductions in the wealth they get under the 
current restructured pay-as-you-go system. This is because they will 
pay higher taxes, but receive the same level of benefits that they 
would have received without privatization.  
To see if this is also the case for Turkey, we calculated the 
change in wealth expected from privatizing BK for representative 
individuals born between 1945 and 1985.  Each representative 
individual is assumed to earn the monthly average wage reported in 
ILO (1996b), to be in the labor force every year from age 25 to 60, 
and get retirement benefits until age 75.31 The amount of the average 
                                                 
30
 Feldstein (1997, p. 38) 
31
 This age is inline with the life expectancy in Turkey.  
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yearly benefits assumed to be same one in ILO (1995b) that was 
converted to annual data32. 
For each representative individual four measures were 
calculated: the present value of benefits with privatization (PVPB), the 
present value of benefits with the current restructured law pay-as-you-
go system (PVCLB), the present value of contributions with 
privatization (PVPC), and the present value of contributions with the 
current restructured law pay-as-you-go system (PVCLC). The change 
in wealth for each representative individual is equal to (PVPB-
PVCLB) minus (PVPC-PVCLC).    
Table 5 presents a summary of the changes in public retirement 
wealth for representative individuals born between 1945 and 1985. 
The results are presented with and without a risk adjustment on 
privatization tax rates. With risk adjustment, tax rates under 
privatization must be higher to maintain trust fund solvency. 
The results show that all representative individuals born between 
1945 and 1975 suffer a reduction in wealth. All representative 
individuals born between 1980 and 1985 would gain net wealth in the 
non-risk adjustment case. No individuals gain wealth in the risk-
adjustment case.  
By looking the trend in the table, we can presumably conclude 
that all representative individuals born after 1985 would experience 
net gains from privatizing in the non-risk adjustment case. There are 
no data available, however, to support the calculations necessary to 
determine when individuals start to gain wealth in the risk-adjustment 
case. 
Table 5 
Change in Wealth for Representative Individuals, By  
Year of Birth, Million TL  
Year of Birth W/O Risk Adjustment Risk Adjusted 
1945 -356 -589 
1950 -964 -1574 
1955 -1781 -2914 
1960 -2435 -4239 
1965 -2359 -4968 
1970 -1724 -5166 
1975 -654 -4856 
1980 914 -3827 
1985 2895 -2191 
                                                 
32
 See Gümüş, E. (2001, 25-26) for details on data conversion method. 
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8. Conclusions  
The main objective of this paper was to investigate, by applying 
a benefit-cost model, whether privatizing the Turkish BK institution 
would be economically superior to the restructured pay-as-you-go 
system, given a set of relevant assumptions. 
As shown in section 3, the restructured pay-as-you-go system 
would require much higher effective social security contribution rates 
until year 2050 in order to pay promised benefits. With the 
restructured system, the deficit (the difference between statutory and 
effective contribution rates) would not disappear during the study 
period, 2000-2050. The higher taxes required to finance the deficit 
would probably distort the labor market equilibrium so severely that a 
substantial welfare cost of such taxes would occur along with a lower 
level of national saving, resulting in a smaller GDP for each year.  
We have identified the sources of benefits and costs associated 
with privatizing BK. By applying the conventional benefit-cost model, 
we obtained results that indicate a long-run economic gain from 
privatizing this institution. A number of sensitivity analyses were 
conducted to check the robustness of our findings. Even in the case 
combining parameters most likely to negatively affect present values 
the most, the present value of net benefit still remain positive. 
Therefore, our analysis indicates, from a social point of view, that 
privatizing BK would quite likely produce a net economic gain in the 
long run. This would be achieved for future generations, however, at 
the expense of the current working population. Thus, from an 
individual standpoint, privatization would be a mixed blessing. As our 
analysis shows, the impact of privatization of BK on representative 
individuals is negative for those who were born before 1980. Our 
finding shows that older workers would be losers from privatization, 
while younger employees and their children would be net gainers. 
Specifically, those who will be working between 2000 and 2025 
would be net losers since they would pay very high contribution rates 
to BK. Those who would enter the labor force after 2025 would pay 
relatively low taxes and therefore be better off, ceteris paribus. 
Our results indicate that the privatization of BK should be 
seriously and immediately considered. This institution requires 
significantly higher effective tax rates (rates required to avoid a 
deficit) for the whole period, 2000-2050, under restructured law. 
Specifically, the effective tax rate under restructured law would 
increase rapidly and it would be 100 percent higher than the statutory 
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tax rate, and it would not decrease. Given the self-employed, and 
therefore self-contributed characteristics of the scheme, it probably 
cannot function at this high contribution rate. Our calculation shows 
that the effective tax rate under privatization would be higher than the 
effective rate under restructured current law for the first 22 years. It 
will be smaller, however, for the rest of the period. In fact, at the end 
of the period, the effective privatization rate would be less than the 
statutory rate. As a result, the present value of net benefits from 
privatizing BK is huge. Our analysis shows that the net benefit of BK 
from privatizing, in year 2050 alone, is 9.05 percent of GDP. This 
fact, alone, is sufficient to attract immediate attention to privatization 
or other reform options for this institution. It is hard to escape the 
conclusion, therefore, that the privatization of BK is matter for urgent 
consideration.  
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Özet 
Kendi adına çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu (Bağ-Kur) reformunun 
fayda-maliyet analizi  
Bu çalışmanın amacı kendi adına çalışanlar sosyal sigortalar kurumunun (Bağ-Kur) 
Feldstein tipi aşamalı özelleştirilmesi ile ortaya çıkması muhtemel sosyal fayda ve maliyetleri 
hesaplamaktır. Özelleştirme ile ilgili fayda ve maliyet modelinin uygulanması için ĐLO’nun 
sağladığı veriler ile kurumun geleceye dönük finansal projeksiyonları yapılılarak geliştirildi. 
Net sosyal faydada oluşan değişimin bugünkü değeri hesaplandı. Öngörülen özelleştirmenin 
temsili şahıslar üzerindeki etkiler de hesaplandı. Elde edilen sonuçlar özelleştirme durumunda 
sosyal faydaların sosyal maliyetlerden fazla olacağını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu durum yapılan 
bazı anahtar varsayımları net sosyal faydayı azaltıcı yönde değiştirdiğimizde dahi geçerliliğini 
korumaktadır. Lakin, önerilen özelleştirme modeli mevcut temsili kuşağı oldukça olumsuz 
etkilediğinden iyi bir siyasi bahane oluşturmakta, ve bu durum özelleştirmenin seçilmesinden 
ziyade aleyhinde bir sonuç oluşturabilmektedir.  
